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We formulate and test a model that allows sharp separation between two different ways
in which environment affects evaluation of outcomes, by comparing social vs. private and
personal responsibility vs. chance. In the experiment, subjects chose between two lotter-
ies, one low-risk and one high-risk. They could then observe the outcomes. By varying the
environment between private (they could observe the outcome of the chosen lottery and
the outcome of the lottery they had not chosen) and social (they could observe the out-
come of the lottery chosen by another subject) we can differentiate the response and brain
activity following the feedback in social and private settings. The evidence suggests that
envy and pride are signiﬁcant motives driving decisions and outcomes evaluation, stronger
than private emotions like regret and rejoice, with ventral striatum playing a key role.When
we focus on the outcome evaluation stage we demonstrate that BOLD signal in ventral
striatum is increasing in the difference between obtained and counterfactual payoffs. For a
given difference in payoffs, striatal responses are more pronounced in social than in private
environment. Moreover, a positive interaction (complementarity) between social compari-
son and personal responsibility is reﬂected in the pattern of activity in the ventral striatum.
At decision stage we observe getting ahead of the Joneses effect in ventral striatum with
subjective value of risk larger in social than in private environment.
Keywords: envy, pride, social comparison, responsibility, regret
INTRODUCTION
We investigate neural correlates of envy and pride during choice
and evaluation of outcomes. Envy is a negative emotion experi-
enced when an individual receives a worse outcome than someone
else; correspondingly, pride is a positive emotion experienced
when that outcome is better than the other’s. Human subjects may
feel envy and pride for different reasons. A classical view (Social
Comparison Theory; Festinger, 1954) is that comparing our per-
formance with others’ can give us a useful signal about our skill,
information that we may want to have even if we are not inter-
ested in relative comparisons, and envy and pride simply help us
to learn from such experience. The other classical view is formu-
lated for example by Veblen (1899): individuals strive for social
dominance, which is their ultimate objective, and envy and pride
reﬂect responses to differences in social status.
Until recently economics has focused mainly on situations
where social comparison is not considered, and the utility of
an economic agent depends only on one’s obtained outcomes
and is independent of others’ outcomes. The works on conspic-
uous consumption in quest for social status (Veblen, 1899) or
relative-income theory of consumption (Duesenberry, 1949) were
rather isolated examples of incorporating social comparison into
economics. More recently the empirical literature on subjective
well-being shows importance of relative-income (Blanchﬂower
and Oswald, 2004; Luttmer, 2005; Dynan and Ravina, 2007).
The experimental work on other-regarding preferences suggests
that players in simple strategic situations are inﬂuenced by rel-
ative outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin,
2002). Social comparison was demonstrated to matter potentially
in many applications like internal wage structure in a ﬁrm (Frank,
1984), use of prizes instead of wages as optimalmotivation devices
(Dubey et al., 2005), or pro-cyclical tax policy as a stabilization tool
(Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000), and many others. In ﬁnance, social
comparison can account for the observed under-diversiﬁcation of
households’ portfolios (Roussanov, 2010). Social comparison has
a potentially broad impact in economics because it affects the cen-
tral concept of utility function. In this light the more important
becomes thorough understanding of social comparison including
its neurobiological basis.
Neuroeconomics focuses on understanding neural basis of
reward system (neurobiological utility), beliefs formation and
emotions that impact decisions, ex post evaluations, and learn-
ing (Glimcher et al., 2008). Numerous studies point to ventral
striatum and orbito-frontal cortex as essential regions that process
reward and values in the brain (McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty
et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Glimcher et al., 2008; Caplin
et al., 2010). Social aspects of reward processing were addressed
by several papers in neuroeconomics (Sanfey et al., 2003; Knoch
et al., 2006; Singer et al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2009). Two most
related papers to ours show that ventral striatum is sensitive to
social comparison (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Dvash et al., 2010).
The ﬁrst paper (Fliessbach et al., 2007) demonstrates that BOLD
www.frontiersin.org February 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 25 | 1
Grygolec et al. Envy and pride wired in the brain
signal in ventral striatum increases as the ratio of relative-income
increases to subject’s advantage (1:2, 1:1, 2:1). In the second paper
(Dvash et al., 2010) the effect of social comparison in ventral stria-
tum is demonstrated by benchmarking social treatment to the
treatment with absolute payoff only (no information about oth-
ers’ outcomes). The limitation of these fMRI studies is that one
cannot exclude the possibility that the main effect comes from
a different type of comparison than social one, i.e., counterfac-
tual comparison reﬂected by activity in ventral striatum (Camille
et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005). Using counterfactual compari-
son as a benchmark social comparison was demonstrated in skin
conductance responses (Bault et al., 2008).
There are at least four factors that distinguish our fMRI study
from the related work in neuroeconomics we mentioned. First, we
consider envy and pride in social comparison as social correspon-
dents of regret and rejoice in counterfactual comparison,whichwe
use as a benchmark for the former. This is a much higher bar for
social comparison to pass as compared to those in the mentioned
papers. Second, the present study is the ﬁrst in neuroeconomics to
weigh two classical explanations of social comparison described
in the ﬁrst paragraph: Veblen’s social status and Festinger’s drive
to compare abilities. Third, thanks to large variability in outcomes
we are able to test robustness of social comparison to loser/winner
effect. Forth,using a two-lottery choice task allows us to investigate
social comparison at decision stage unlike earlier studies (Fliess-
bach et al., 2007; Dvash et al., 2010). The studies (Bault et al., 2008,
2011), where a similar design is used, are closely related. Differ-
ently from Bault et al. (2011), in the current study the emphasis is
in the decomposition of the counterfactual comparison in chance
and personal responsibility, based on a speciﬁc formal model that
we now present.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Our work can be conceptualized within the axiomatic framework
of social decision theory laid out in Maccheroni et al. (forth
coming), hereafter MMR, who extend regret theory (Loomes
and Sudgen, 1982) into social context, with envy and pride as
social correspondents of regret and rejoice. The theory consid-
ers a decision-maker that observes both the outcome x obtained
from his choice, and the counterfactual outcome y, that is an out-
come he could have had alternatively. The value function V (x, y)
of outcome proﬁle (x, y) is a sum of personal utility u(x) from
the obtained outcome x and relative utility G(x − y). The lat-
ter part captures importance of counterfactual comparison of the
obtained outcome x vs. the counterfactual outcome y. This is a
generalization of classical expected utility theory, incorporating
relative utility. How important relative utility is for well-being of
decision-maker, given x and y, potentially depends on the nature
of counterfactual outcome y.
Themodel allows a distinction between private and social envi-
ronments. In private environment a counterfactual outcome y is
just what the individual could have had. In social environment a
counterfactual outcome y is what he could have had, but some-
one else obtained. Independently of distinction between private
vs. social environment, this setup may distinguish between chance
and personal responsibility. In case of chance, a decision-maker
obtained x rather than y due to pure luck. This occurs for example
when x and y are outcomes of the same chosen lottery, but drawn
independently. As for personal responsibility a decision-maker
could have obtained a counterfactual outcome y if he had made a
different choice. In general, the ex post value function is:
V ij (x , y) = u(x) + Gij (x − y) (1)
where the superscript i denotes private or social environment, and
j denotes chance or personal responsibility. To evaluate lotteries
ex ante, before choice is made, a decision-maker uses expectation
of a value function V ij (x , y) with respect to a subjective belief over
states of nature.Oneof themain features of themodel is that it pro-
vides separation of the personal u(x) and relativeGij (x−y) utility:
here we focus on the latter. TheGij functions have natural interpre-
tation, for example: the function G00 is the disappointment/elation
function (private environment and chance responsibility), the
function G01 the regret/rejoice function (private environment and
personal responsibility), andG1j the envy/gloating function (social
environment, and either chance or personal responsibility).
HYPOTHESES
Our primary objective is to investigate social comparison at out-
come evaluation stage. To simplify the analysis we assume that
functions Gij (x − y) are linear, and we refer to Gij as a slope. If
this model is taken as a model of the ex ante choice, then a linear
G function would make the model identical to expected utility:
that is, it would produce the same choice as that of an individual
that ignores inter-personal comparisons. For this reason we rather
interpret linear functions Gij (x − y) as approximations to true
non-linear functions. We state now formally our hypotheses:
1. Counterfactual comparison: Gij > 0 for all i, j.
2. Social comparison: G1j − G0j > 0.
3. Personal responsibility: Gi1 − Gi0 > 0.
4. Positive interaction (complementarity) between social com-
parison and personal responsibility effects: G11 − G01
> G10 − G00 .
5. Correspondence between behavioral and neural effects.
The ﬁrst hypothesis asserts that the subjective value of the obtained
outcome x, while a decision-maker could have had the outcome
y, depends on the comparison of x and y, or Gij = 0. In addi-
tion, we hypothesize that the functions Gij are increasing. In other
words, the subject’s relative utility Gij is increasing in the subject’s
advantage (that is the difference x − y) over the counterfactual
payoff. The second hypothesis of social comparison states that
the counterfactual comparison matters more in a social than in a
private environment. Simply, if a subject earns $1 more than the
other person his relative utility is larger as compared to earning
$1 more than the counterfactual outcome in private environ-
ment. The third hypothesis concerns personal responsibility effect,
which states that the counterfactual comparison ismore important
in case of personal rather than chance responsibility. Intuitively,
the subject is more affected in terms of relative utility if advan-
tage (or x − y) in counterfactual comparison is due to his choice
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FIGURE 1 |Trial timing with duration and sequence of events.The study
focuses on ex post evaluation stage that is divided into two events: outcome
event and comparison event. The events presented in this Figure refer to the
treatment of social environment and personal responsibility. At comparison
event, a subject (“you”) conducts counterfactual comparison of “what you
got” as compared to “what you could have had, but the other got.”The
clause “but the other got” extends counterfactual comparison into social
comparison.
rather than just pure chance. The forth hypothesis is positive
interaction (complementarity) between social comparison and
personal responsibility effects. It is about personal responsibility
effect being stronger in the social than in the private environment.
The last ﬁfth hypothesis is the correspondence between the neural
and behavioral effects.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We recruited 63 participants from introductory courses in micro-
economics and macroeconomics at University of Minnesota to
participate in 21 experimental sessions. In each session one partici-
pantwas placed insidemagnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner
and two other at computers outside the scanner in a separate
room. All subjects in each experimental session faced otherwise
the same task. The 21 scanned participants were right-handed,
healthymales, aged 18–20 years old (mean 18.5, SD0.6). Forty-two
subjects (18 females and 24 males) participated in the experiment
outside the scanner. We later discovered that the subject in the
scanner and one of the other two had a personal relationship, sowe
drop this session from analysis and analyze data from 20 sessions.
All subjects gave informed consent to participate according to
the procedures approved by University of Minnesota Institutional
Review Board.
EXPERIMENTAL TASK
Subjects chose between two lotteries in each of 70 consecutive
rounds. Each lottery had two possible outcomes ranging from a
minimum value of −$5 to a maximum of $25. Three subjects
performed the same task in each experimental session. One male
subject was placed inside MRI machine. The two others made
choices at computers through a remote connection in a separate
room. We dropped one session from analysis due to violation of
experimental procedures. The main focus of this paper is on the
20 scanned subjects, for whom we collected both behavioral and
neural data according to the study procedures. Subjects were con-
nected over computer network. No deception was used at any
time. Subjects chose repeatedly a lottery from a pair of lotteries,
a low-risk and a high-risk one. In a typical trial each subject had
2 s to evaluate lotteries, and then made a decision without time
constraints: see Figure 1. Choice was followed by display of lotter-
ies for 2 s, and then determination of outcome for each. Lotteries
together with ﬁnal outcomes were then shown for 2 s (outcome
event). Subjects then observed for 5 s two bars representing the
obtainedpayoff and the counterfactual payoff (comparison event).
Each of 70 trials ended with a subjective rating on the integer scale
0–10 (we labeled 0 as bad, 5 as neutral, 10 as good) without time
constraints. The outcomes of lotteries were drawn once and for all
using the actual probabilities for each of 72 trials. These outcomes
were the same in all 21 experimental sessions.
TIMING
Each of 70 periods started with a ﬁxation screen pre-announcing
either the social or the private environment. Next, we asked the
subject to choose from two lotteries. After a display of 2 s, a cue
was given indicating that a choice could be made. The subject had
unlimited time to decide his choice of lottery. The average choice
time was 5 s. The lottery chosen by the subject was highlighted
for 2 s for decision conﬁrmation. Sometimes, a subject in addi-
tion learned the choice of lottery by one other subject selected
randomly. This could lead to the delay of presentation of choices
that last 0.7 s on average. After that an arrow appeared over the pie
chart describing each lottery on the screen, started to spin instantly,
and stopped pointing to the outcome of lottery after an average
spinning time of 1.9 s. Pie charts and arrows pointing to outcomes
were kept on the screen for 2 s. After that, a subject was presented
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for ﬁxed 5 s with his obtained payoff vs. the counterfactual payoff
he could have had according to the relevant condition. This event,
called comparison event, is the main focus of brain data analysis.
The period endedwith the question“How did thatmake you feel?”
that a subject answered on the integer scale 0–10, with 0 – “Bad,”
5 – “Neutral,” and 10 – “Good.”
PAYMENTS
Subjects received a ﬁxed participation payment of $15; the subject
in the MRI machine received additional $25. In addition subjects
were paid the outcomes of three randomly determined out of
those they had chosen during 70 periods. Outcomes of lotteries
varied from −$5 to $25, so losses were possible. To cover poten-
tial losses a participant received an additional payment of $15.
The three paid lotteries were drawn at the end of the session. The
total ﬁxed payment was $55 to a scanned subject and $30 to a
subject participating outside MRI scanner. The average additional
payment from the three paid lotteries to subjects scanned in MRI
was $11.25, with minimum −$4, maximum $39, and SD $10.97.
The average performance payment to subjects participating out-
sideMRI was $12.80, with minimum −$7,maximum $46, and SD
$12.39.
ANALYSIS
At the decision stage there was only one factor with two levels:
private vs. social environment. In the social environment each sub-
ject was choosing a lottery expecting to learn its outcome as well
as choice and obtained outcome of the other randomly matched
subject. In contrast in private environment a subject was not pro-
vided with any information about others. At the evaluation stage
we used 2× 2 factorial design.
The two independent factors were: environment and responsi-
bility. Each factor had two levels: private vs. social environment,
and chance vs. personal responsibility. There were 20 trials in
each of three treatments: (private, personal), (social, chance), and
(social, personal). There were 10 trials in the treatment (private,
chance). The order of treatments in a session was random. We
used the set of 20 different pairs of lotteries shown at most once
in each treatment, see Table A1 in Appendix.
We now explain the four treatments present at the evaluation
stage, the stage consisting of outcome and comparison events, see
Figure A1 inAppendix for displays used in different treatments. In
treatment (private, chance) a subject saw at outcome event only the
lottery he chose, and at comparison event the obtained outcome
vs. the unrealized outcomewithin the chosen lottery. In contrast in
treatment (private, personal) a subject observed at outcome event
both the lottery he chose and the lottery he did not choose, fol-
lowed with comparison event presenting the outcome of chosen
lottery vs. the outcome of lottery he could but did not choose.
Treatment (social, chance) occurred if subjects in a random match
chose the same lottery. In this case we resolved the same lottery
independently for each subject in the match. Consequently, a sub-
ject in the match observed at outcome event the two instances of
the same lottery, one instance applying to him and other instance
applying to other subject. The outcome event was followed with
comparison event presenting subject’s outcome vs. other’s out-
come. Finally, treatment (social, personal) occurred if subjects in a
randommatch chose different lotteries. At outcome stage a subject
observed a lottery he chose and a lottery chosen by the other
subject in a random match. This was followed with a comparison
event presenting subject’s outcome against the outcome obtained
by the other.
fMRI ACQUISITION AND PREPROCESSING
We collected data at Magnetic Resonance Research Center at Uni-
versity of Minnesota using 3T Siemens Trio scanner. High resolu-
tion anatomical images were obtained using Siemens T1-weighted
3D ﬂash 1mm sequence. Functional images were acquired using
echo planar imaging with repetition time (TR) 2000ms, echo time
(TE) 23ms, ﬂip angle 90˚, 64× 64 matrix, 38 slices per scan, axial
slices 3mm thick with no gap, voxel size 3mm× 3mm× 3mm.
Functional images were acquired with an oblique 30˚ angle to
the anterior commissure–posterior commissure (AC–PC) line to
optimize signal acquisition from orbito-frontal cortex. The data
were preprocessed and analyzed using Brain Voyager QX 1.8.
The anatomical images were transformed into Talairach space
in two steps: ﬁrst the cerebrum was rotated into AC–PC plane
using trilinear transformation, second we identiﬁed eight refer-
ence points (AC, PC, and six boundary points) to ﬁt the cerebrum
into Talairach template using trilinear transformation. We pre-
processed functional data performing slice scan time correction,
3Dmovement correction relative to the ﬁrst volume using trilinear
estimation and interpolation, removal of linear trend togetherwith
low frequencynon-linear trends using high-pass ﬁlter.Next,we co-
registered functional with anatomical data to obtain Talairach ref-
erenced voxel time courses, to which we applied spatial smoothing
using Gaussian ﬁlter of 7mm.
fMRI ANALYSIS
The analysis was performed in Brain Voyager QX; the statistical
analysis in Stata. We used GLM model with continuous pre-
dictors of interest convolved with two-gamma hemo-dynamic
response function (Bv¨chel et al., 1998).Weproceeded in three steps
separately for decision and outcome evaluation stages. First, we
performed whole-brain analysis with treatments collapsed using
random-effects General Linear Model (RFX GLM) to identify
functional region-of-interests (ROIs). We then examined treat-
ment effects in the regions identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step. We ﬁnally
performed whole-brain analysis with RFX GLM focusing on rel-
ative treatment effects. At ex post outcome evaluation stage we
focused on two events of interest: outcome and comparison, while
controlling for the remaining events of no interest with dummy
variables.We implementedmodel designswith continuous predic-
tors of product of delta function (a box car function over 500ms)
and value of advantage at event comparison. In model designs dif-
ferentiating between treatments we used separate predictors of
advantage for each treatment considered. We controlled for the
obtained payoff by a subject with a continuous predictor being
a product of delta function (2000ms) and value of the obtained
payoff by a subject at event outcome. In analyzing ex ante evalu-
ation of choice alternatives we focused on the event lotteries. We
implemented model designs with continuous predictors of prod-
uct of delta function (500ms) and value of risk-adjusted return of
high-risk lottery at the event lotteries.
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Table 1 | Counterfactual comparisons in behavioral data.
Private (i =0) Social (i =1)
Personal (j =1) G01 = 0.169 (t = 7.7) G11 = 0.185 (t = 6.2)
Chance (j =0) G00 = 0.098 (t = 6.1) G10 = 0.113 (t = 6.8)
The coefﬁcients Gij on advantage (with t-values in brackets) from the regression
analysis of affective ratings as a function of the obtained outcome (payoff= x), and
counterfactual comparison (advantage= x− y) of the obtained outcome (x) and
counterfactual outcome (y) made in different conditions. The constant is 4.896
(t=55.84) and the coefﬁcient of the payoff is 0.147 (t=9.06) with R2 =58.9%.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
We focus on the question how self reported affective ratings (vari-
able affect ) dependon subjects’obtainedoutcome (variable payoff)
and counterfactual comparison relevant to treatment (variable
advantage). The variable advantage is the difference between the
payoff obtained by the subject and the counterfactual payoff. We
estimate the model given by Eq. 2 using OLS with robust SE
corrected for in-subject correlation in observations:
affect = α+ β · payoff +
∑
i,j=0,1
Gij · advantageij (2)
The results reported in Table 1 conﬁrm hypothesis that coun-
terfactual comparisons matter in the evaluations of outcomes of
choices, for example the estimated Gij coefﬁcients are positive
and signiﬁcantly different from 0. The affective rating of outcome
proﬁle depends not only on the obtained payoff but also on the
counterfactual comparison.
To investigate the effect of personal responsibility we test
whether the importance of counterfactual comparisons is higher
in personal than in chance responsibility separately for the pri-
vate (G01 − G00 ) > 0 and the social (G11 − G10 ) > 0 environment
using the above estimates of Gij . The personal responsibility effect
is highly signiﬁcant in both cases according to a two-sided Wald
test: F(1, 19)= 26.28 with p< 0.001 and F(1, 19)= 13.28 with
p= 0.002, respectively. Similarly for the social comparison effect
we test whether the importance of counterfactual comparisons is
higher in the social than in the private environment separately for
chance (G10 − G00 ) > 0 and personal (G11 − G01 ) > 0 responsi-
bility treatments. The social comparison effect has the right sign
but is not signiﬁcant in both cases using two-sided Wald test: F(1,
19)= 1.24 with p > 0.1 and F(1, 19)= 0.77 with >0.1, respec-
tively. To check the forthhypothesis of positive interactionbetween
social comparison and personal responsibility we construct the
complementarity index CI:
CI =
(
G11 + G00
)− (G01 + G10
)
0.25 · (G11 + G00 + G01 + G10
) (3)
The numerator in Eq. 3 captures the degree of complementarity
between two factors. If it is positive then factors are comple-
mentary (positive interaction), if zero they are independent (no
interaction), and if negative they are substitutable (negative inter-
action). The denominator in Eq. 3 is a normalization introduced
so that CI is independent of scaling of variables. We estimated CI
individual by individual ﬁnding mean CI= 0.21, which is positive
as hypothesized. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the two factors: environment and responsibility are independent
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 0.34, p > 0.1).
fMRI RESULTS
We performed whole-brain analysis of ex post evaluation of out-
comes. The evaluation stage was partitioned in two distinct events:
outcome event (which lasted 2 s) followed immediately by compar-
ison event (5 s), see Figure 1. During the outcome event subjects
were shown the lotteries, relevant to treatment, and their out-
comes. In the comparison event subjects observed the obtained
outcome vs. the counterfactual outcome, with the latter vary-
ing according to treatments. In the statistical models we test we
use the outcome event to control for the obtained payoff, while
during the comparison event we focus on counterfactual compar-
ison. The partitioning of the outcome evaluation stage into two
events allowed us to better control the nature of counterfactual
comparison between the obtained and counterfactual outcomes,
while also temporally decouple the predictors of the obtained and
counterfactual payoffs.
UNIVERSAL NETWORK FOR COUNTERFACTUALS
Our strategy is toﬁrst identify brain areas that are involved in coun-
terfactual comparisons in general,without differentiating between
different treatments. To this end we use model design with lin-
ear predictors (Bv¨chel et al., 1998) in the obtained payoff and the
advantage (with all treatments collapsed) and consider the contrast
of advantage against the baseline. With conservative threshold of
p< 0.01 (Bonferroni corrected) we ﬁnd increased activations only
in striatum bilaterally, see Figure 2A. However, with more liberal
threshold of p < 0.02 (FDR corrected) we ﬁnd also other clusters
associatedwith reward processing likemPFCandOFC, seeTable 2,
among other regions, see Table A2 in Appendix. In the second
step we extract average BOLD time-series from the regions iden-
tiﬁed above and perform ROI analysis to test our hypotheses. We
FIGURE 2 | Regions of interest identified. (A) Ventral striatum bilaterally
shows increased activity at the contrast of linear advantage against the
baseline with p<0.01 (Bonferroni corrected). (B) Anterior insula bilaterally
shows increased activity at the contrast with dummy predictors: Social
Loss less Private Loss with p<0.001 (uncorrected), where Loss=1 if
advantage <0, and 0 otherwise. Details of coordinates inTable 2.
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Table 2 | Areas in universal network for counterfactuals.
ROIs Average coordinates Max t Size p-Value
x y z
l LGP −14 2 −4 8.7 350 p<0.01 Bonf.
r LGP 17 2 −3 6.0 66 p<0.01 Bonf.
OFC −4 23 −12 4.1 150 p<0.02 FDR
mPFC −2 43 −2 4.8 572 p<0.01 FDR
l/r, left/right; LGP, lateral globus pallidus; OFC, orbito-frontal cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex.
differentiate between different treatments by considering model
designs with one factor at the time, instead of two, in order to
increase power. For clarity we report below the results on the
left ventral striatum, and very similar results on the right ventral
striatum are reported in the Appendix.
We ran random-effects panel regression to explain aver-
age BOLD time-series in the cluster of left striatum with lin-
ear predictors (convolved with standard two gammas hemo-
dynamic response function) in private advantage (coefﬁcient
G0 = 0.77 with z = 7.79, p< 0.001) and social advantage (coef-
ﬁcient G1 = 1.07 with z = 11.31, p< 0.001), while controlling for
the obtained payoff. Both coefﬁcients are positive and signiﬁcantly
different from zero, which demonstrates the involvement of left
striatum in counterfactual comparisons.
The difference in coefﬁcients on social less private advan-
tage is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (two-sided Wald test,
χ2 = 5.45, p= 0.02). The same analysis after the introduction of a
responsibility factor shows that the coefﬁcients on chance advan-
tage (coefﬁcient 0.79, z = 7.93, p< 0.001) and personal advan-
tage (coefﬁcient 1.05 with z = 11.14, p< 0.001) are signiﬁcantly
different from zero, with the difference between the latter and
the former positive and statistically signiﬁcant (two-sided Wald
test, χ2 = 4.18, p= 0.04). The results conﬁrm again the involve-
ment of left striatum in counterfactual processing and show that
it is stronger for personal rather than chance responsibility, see
Figure 3. To exclude the possibility that correlation of payoff
and advantage drives the results we consider the model designs
with advantage normalized to mean 0 and SD 1, without con-
trolling for payoffs. We run subject by subject regressions to
explain BOLD time-series convolved with HRF linear predictors
in normalized advantage, so that we obtain individual by individ-
ual coefﬁcients allowing us to perform non-parametric statistical
tests. Considering environment factor we ﬁnd that coefﬁcients
on normalized private (coefﬁcient 4.30, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, z = 3.73, p< 0.001) and social advantage (coefﬁcient 6.03,
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 3.92, p< 0.001) are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. The difference between the latter and the
former is also positive and signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z = 1.79, p= 0.07). Switching to responsibility factor we observe
that coefﬁcients on normalized chance (coefﬁcient 3.49,Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, z = 3.21, p= 0.001) and personal advantage
(coefﬁcient 6.52, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 3.92, p< 0.001)
are positive and signiﬁcantly different from 0. The difference
between coefﬁcients onpersonal less chance normalized advantage
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
FIGURE 3 |We performed ROI analysis, considering one factor at the
time, on the cluster of left ventral striatum, identified earlier as a part
of universal network for counterfactuals, showing that coefficients on
linear predictors in advantage are positive in all treatments.The
coefﬁcient on advantage is larger in social than in private environment and
with personal than with chance responsibility.
z = 2.02, p= 0.04). The non-parametric analysis of normalized
advantage, without controlling for payoff, conﬁrms the results
obtained in panel analysis when we controlled for payoffs.
To investigate the interaction between the two factors, envi-
ronment and responsibility, we consider the disaggregated model
design with all four treatments. We estimated neural CI (Eq. 3)
in left ventral striatum cluster to be 1.82 and signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 2.46, p= 0.01).
Further, for each participant we compute CI in the left striatal
cluster and based on affective ratings, and found that the neural
CI is positively correlated with behavioral CI with Pearson corre-
lation coefﬁcient 0.4 see Figure 4. The OLS regression of neural
CI against behavioral CI gives a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient 0.94
(p= 0.08). The robust regression of neural CI vs. behavioral CI,
that weights away outliers and leverage points, gives very similar
results to OLS regression with coefﬁcient on behavioral CI of 0.92
(p = 0.03). However, this result is not robust to entirely removing
the two extreme points from the right or two extreme outliers (see
Figure 4) from the OLS regression.
NEURAL TREATMENT EFFECTS
The previous analysis focused on the regions of interest involved in
the counterfactual comparisons in all conditions. However, some
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FIGURE 4 | BOLD data in the left ventral striatum exhibit positive
interaction, or complementarity between responsibility and
environment factors as measured by complementarity index CI=1.82
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z =2.46, p=0.01), see Eq. 3 for definition
of CI.The Figure shows that neural CI (x -axis) predicts behavioral CI (y -axis).
brain regions may be involved selectively only in some treatments,
or may deviate from baseline in the opposite directions in differ-
ent treatments. To account for these possibilities we use model
design differentiating between private vs. social environment in
order to identify the regions of interest involved. We performed
the whole-brain analysis looking at the contrast between social
less private advantage, while controlling for payoffs (all being lin-
ear predictors). In terms of MMR model we are looking for brain
regions in which G1 −G0 = 0. At the threshold p< 0.005 (uncor-
rected) and cluster size 50 voxels we ﬁnd increased activity in right
striatum (left striatal cluster is slightly above threshold), supe-
rior frontal gyrus (SFG), and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(right DLPFC) among other regions. Conﬁrming above ﬁndings
the ROI analysis of right striatal cluster reveals that the coefﬁ-
cients on private G0 = 0.1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 3.6,
p< 0.001) and social advantage G1 = 0.21 (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, z = 3.85, p< 0.001) are positive and signiﬁcantly different
from 0. In addition, the difference between coefﬁcients on social
less private advantage G1 −G0 is positive and signiﬁcantly greater
than 0 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 3.3, p< 0.001). In the
ROI analysis we computed for each participant a gloating index
(G1 −G0)/(G0 +G1) in the right striatal cluster and separately
a behavioral one based on affective ratings. Using robust regres-
sion we found behavioral gloating index to be predicted by its
neural counterpart individual by individual: a constant −0.21
(p= 0.07) and a coefﬁcient 0.22 (p= 0.01). As caution is nec-
essary when using robust regression, we ﬁnd positive correlation
of neural and behavioral gloating indices at individual level to
strengthen the ﬁnding of social comparison effect at aggregate
level documented above. In addition to right striatum we found
also SFG and right DLPFC to exhibit increased activity at the
contrast between social less private advantage, while controlling
for payoffs. However, in contrast to right striatum neither SFG
nor right DLPFC was identiﬁed to be part of universal net-
work for counterfactuals. The ROI analysis reveals that both SFG
and right DLPFC show positive linear response only to social
advantage. In case of SFG the coefﬁcients on private advantage
G0 =−0.06 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z =−1.8, p= 0.07) and
social advantage G1 = 0.1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 2.3,
p= 0.02) are signiﬁcantly different from zero, but have oppo-
site signs. The last fact explains why we did not detect SFG
to be part of the universal network for counterfactuals. The
difference between coefﬁcients on social less private advantage
G1 −G0 in SFG is positive and signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, z = 3.36, p< 0.001). ROI analysis of right DLPFC exhibits
similar pattern. The similar exercise along chance vs. personal
responsibility dimension has not led to identiﬁcation of other
regions than those already found in the universal network for
counterfactuals.
LOSER ANDWINNER EFFECT
There exists a possibility that, rather than being more linearly
responsive to advantage in social than in private environment, the
brain regions are only more responsive to a win or a loss in social
than in private environment, nomatter how large the advantage is.
Inour experiment the variable advantage varied from−22 through
+21, with 34 intermediate discrete values, and contiguous values
in the interval from −11 to 11. Given this variability in advantage
we are able to run robustness check of the above ﬁndings by con-
sidering the model design with both linear and dummy predictors
of interest. In addition to linear predictors in payoff, private, and
social advantage we include dummy predictors: social win (equal
to 1 if social advantage is strictly larger than 0, and equal to 0
otherwise), and similarly deﬁned variables social loss, private win,
and private loss.
The ROI analysis in the clusters of right stratum, SFG, and
right DLPFC, identiﬁed above shows that greater positive linear
response to social than private advantage in these regions is robust
to private/social win/loss effects. The difference in coefﬁcients on
linear predictors of social less private advantage G1 −G0 was pos-
itive and signiﬁcant in all three regions: right striatum (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, z = 2.9, p= 0.004), SFG (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, z = 1.8, p= 0.07), and right DLPFC (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, z = 2.2, p= 0.03). Further, we looked at contrasts between
dummy predictors. In the whole-brain analysis in the contrast
social loss vs. private loss we found increased activity in anterior
insula bilaterally, see Figure 2B. The ROI analysis of left insula
cluster reveals a percentage BOLD change only to social loss to be
positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, z = 3.3, p< 0.001), while in cases of private loss, private
win, and social win we fail to reject the hypothesis that percent-
age BOLD change is zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p > 0.6), see
Figure 5.
GETTING AHEAD OF THE JONESES
Until nowwe presented behavioral and neural evidence that coun-
terfactual comparisons matter in ex post evaluations of choice
outcomes. They are stronger in social than private environment
and with personal than chance responsibility. We predict similar
results during the ex ante evaluations of choice alternatives, that
is, in the process leading to choice. In the analysis of ex post evalu-
ations we considered two factors: environment (private vs. social)
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FIGURE 5 | Region-of-interest analysis of left anterior insula shows
increased activity only to social loss (equal to 1 if advantage is strictly
less than 0 in social environment, and equal to 0 otherwise), and
around zero or slightly negative activity in cases of social win or
private win/loss.
and responsibility (chance vs. personal). In contrast, in the analysis
of ex ante evaluations of choice alternatives we considered envi-
ronment factor only. In the beginning of a trial subjects learned
whether they are in private or social environment but not whether
the trial involves chance or personal responsibility. The analysis of
the ex ante evaluations of choice alternatives, two binary lotteries
in our case, is complicated by the fact that outcomes of lotteries are
risky at the evaluation stage. In the previous analysis we assumed
for simplicity that relative utility in MMR model is linear. How-
ever, under the linearity assumption MMR model applied to ex
ante evaluations is equivalent to expected utility model, meaning
that both models generate the same choices and counterfactual
comparisons do not matter for choice behavior. Therefore, it is
necessary to adjust risk attitudes of subjects in the ex ante analy-
sis. Our empirical strategy is to consider risk-adjusted return as a
variable of interest. Recall that each choice situation in our study
involved two binary lotteries with similar expected values, low-
risk vs. high-risk one. We focus on the question how the choice of
high-risk lottery depended on its risk-adjusted return. We deﬁne
risk-adjusted return as expected value of lottery divided by SD.
The view that risk-adjusted return drives decisions has been sup-
ported in the literature (Weber and Johnson, 2009), which justiﬁes
our approach.
We ﬁrst examine behavioral data with logit regression aim-
ing to explain the choice of high-risk rather than low-risk lottery
with risk-adjusted return of high-risk lottery in private vs. social
environment. Borrowing intuition from ﬁnance one can interpret
the regression coefﬁcient on risk-adjusted return as the subjective
value of risk. We run logit regression subject by subject obtain-
ing the average subjective value of risk to be 0.14 (SEM 0.22)
in private and 0.68 (SEM 0.2) in social environments. The for-
mer is not signiﬁcantly different from 0 (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, z = 0.3, p= 0.79), while the latter is positive and signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 2.9,
p= 0.004). The subjective value of risk is signiﬁcantly larger in
social than in private environment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z = 2.4, p= 0.02). This may suggest that subjects choose more
often high-risk lotteries in social than in private environment.
However, high-risk lotteries are not all the same. Focusing on
high-risk lotteries we can consider those with below and above
median risk, namely the median of SD of high-risk lottery in the
pair of lotteries presented to subjects. Themedian value was $6.58.
High-risk lotteries with below median risk are chosen with lower
frequency in social (47%) than in private (52%) environment. The
reverse pattern holds for high-risk lotteries with abovemedian risk
as subjects choose the high-risk lotteries with higher frequency
in social (42%) than in private (38%) environment. A Wilcoxon
signed-rank test shows that the ﬁrst difference is not signiﬁcant
(z = 1.01 and p> 0.1, while the latter is signiﬁcant (z =−2.02,
p= 0.04).
This analysis suggests that subjects adjust their decisions in
social as compared to private environment in order to get ahead
of others. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the literature on expe-
rience based tasks showing social exposure to increase risk-taking
(Yechiam et al., 2008).
Guided by the behavioral results we performed analogical
analysis of neural data at the decision stage. Given our interest
in reward system, and especially in ventral striatum, our use of
risk-adjusted return as predictor in neural analysis can be jus-
tiﬁed by the ﬁnding that ventral striatum tracks both expected
reward and variance (Preuschoff et al., 2006). We ﬁrst consider
the model design with linear predictor in risk-adjusted return,
without distinction between private and social environments. In
the contrast of risk-adjusted return against the baseline, with
threshold p< 0.005 uncorrected, we found increased activity in
ventral striatum bilaterally and decreased activity in OFC (see
Table 2). In the ROI analysis of the left cluster of ventral stria-
tum we looked at the linear response to risk-adjusted return in
private vs. social environment. In both cases the coefﬁcients were
positive and signiﬁcantly different from 0: private coefﬁcient 0.04
(SEM 0.032, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 1.75, p= 0.08) and
social coefﬁcient 0.14 (SEM 0.025, Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z = 3.5, p< 0.001). Crucially, the difference between the coefﬁ-
cients in social vs. private environment was positive and highly
signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 3.1, p= 0.002). The
similar results apply to right cluster of ventral striatum. As for
OFC the analogical ROI analysis revealed that the coefﬁcients
on risk-adjusted return were negative and signiﬁcant with pri-
vate coefﬁcient −0.17 (SEM 0.12, Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z =−3.6, p< 0.001) and social coefﬁcient −0.05 (SEM 0.11,
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z =−3.1, p= 0.04). The difference
between social and private coefﬁcients was positive and signiﬁ-
cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 2.4, p= 0.02). Subsequently,
we considered the model design with linear predictors in risk-
adjusted return, both in private and social environments. Look-
ing at the contrast social less private risk-adjusted return with
threshold p< 0.005 uncorrected we found increased activity in
striatum bilaterally and OFC as above. In addition we found
also increased activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and
right dorsolateral-cortex (rDLPFC) among other regions. The
ROI analysis shows that BOLD activity is decreasing in risk-
adjusted return in ACC and rDLPFC in private environment.
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The coefﬁcients on private risk-adjusted return are negative and
signiﬁcant, with coefﬁcient in ACC equal to −0.1 (SEM 0.04,
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z =−2.2, p= 0.03). The coefﬁcient
in rDLPFC was −0.07 (SEM 0.04, Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z =−1.5, p= 0.13). In contrast coefﬁcients on social risk-adjusted
return are positive and signiﬁcant with coefﬁcient in ACC 0.07
(SEM 0.03, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 1.8, p= 0.08) and the
coefﬁcient in rDLPFC 0.08 (SEM 0.03,Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z = 2.9, p= 0.004).
CONCLUSION
Our results put social comparison in new light and strengthen
existing ﬁndings. We document as in existing literature a crucial
role of ventral striatum, a part of brain reward system, in social
comparisons. Focusing on outcome evaluation stage we showed
that social emotions like envy and pride are stronger than cor-
responding private emotions like regret and rejoice as measured
by ventral striatum responses. First, this conﬁrms Veblen’s view
of envy and pride as reﬂecting differences in social status. Sec-
ond, this is important ﬁnding as other studies established social
comparison effect in ventral striatum only against the baseline
(Fliessbach et al., 2007; Dvash et al., 2010), without reference
to any other alternative comparison process, i.e., counterfactual
comparison (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005). More,
social comparison in ventral striatum is stronger in case of per-
sonal than chance responsibility for outcomes, which amounts to
positive interaction of social environment and personal respon-
sibility. We favor interpretation that difference between personal
and chance responsibility for outcomes is about how much can
be inferred about skill vs. luck of decision-maker during com-
parison process. Given this interpretation, positive interaction
of social environment and personal responsibility conﬁrms Fes-
tinger’s view of envy and pride as helping people to learn skills
from others. We show that larger linear response in social than
in private environment to difference in outcomes is robust to
winner/loser effect. At the same time we ﬁnd social loser effect
in anterior insula, a region associated with negative emotions.
Interestingly, we did not ﬁnd for this region similar loser effect
in private environment or winner effects in either environment.
Nor we found differential linear response in private vs. social
environment. This suggests that the very social loss, no matter
how large evokes strong negative emotion. These ﬁndings ﬁt well
with increased activity in anterior insula predicting rejections of
unfair offers (worse than 50:50) in ultimatum game (Sanfey et al.,
2003). We ﬁnd also increased activity in areas related to Theory
of Mind reasoning in social vs. private environment. At decision
stage we observe getting ahead of the Joneses effect with subjec-
tive value of risk as measured by activity in ventral striatum being
larger in social than in private environment. Not surprisingly sub-
jects assume extreme risk more often in social than in private
environment. One another interesting aspect of brain response
to risk-adjusted return at decision stage is increased activity in
rDLPFC and ACC in social vs. private environment. Both regions
were shown previously to exhibit increased activity the higher the
decision conﬂict present (MacDonald et al., 2000). In this light one
interpretation of our results would be that the subjects have deci-
sion conﬂict in social environment whether to assume extreme
risk and possibly get ahead of others or keep taking reasonable
risks only.
Further research on social comparisons is needed to under-
stand it better. It may have far reaching consequences as social
comparison affects utility function, a central concept in econom-
ics. A direction of future research would be to focus on decision
stage and investigate idiosyncratic as compared to systematic risk
in private vs. social environment. Another interesting direction of
research to pursue is the relationship between temporal discount-
ing and social comparison, topics that independently received
considerable attention in neuroeconomics. Motivated by personal
responsibility effect in our study the hypothesis is that patient
individuals are more envious and proud if differences in relative
outcomes are mainly due to different skills. The intuition is that
patient individuals would weighmore the future differences in rel-
ative outcomes. Yet another intriguing question is the relationship
between social comparisons in different domains:me-vs.-others as
compared to among others. One possibility is that the more envi-
ous and proud individual the higher is his preference for equality
among others, for this increases chances he is in better situation
than anyone else.
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APPENDIX
In the section on the universal network for counterfactuals we
focus on reporting results concerning the left ventral striatum.
However, the results concerning the right ventral striatum are very
similar, and we omitted them in the main text in order not to
ﬂood the reader with too many statistics, which we report here
in the Appendix. The cluster of right ventral striatum identiﬁed
as a part of the universal network for counterfactuals included
66 voxels at p< 0.01 (Bonferroni corrected). The coefﬁcients on
private (G0 = 0.61 with z = 5.68, p< 0.001) and social advantage
(coefﬁcient G1 = 1.08 with z = 10.56, p< 0.001) are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. The difference in coefﬁcients on social less
private advantage is also positive and statistically signiﬁcant (two-
sided Wald test, χ2 = 11.61, p< 0.001). The analysis for responsi-
bility factor shows the coefﬁcients on chance advantage (coefﬁcient
0.73, z = 6.79, p< 0.001) and personal advantage (coefﬁcient 0.97
with z = 9.46, p< 0.001) to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant,
with the difference between the latter and the former positive and
statistically signiﬁcant (two-sided Wald test, χ2 = 2.86, p= 0.09).
Aswe did for the left ventral striatum in themain text to exclude
the possibility that correlation of payoff and advantage drives the
results we consider the model designs with advantage normalized
to mean 0 and SD 1, without controlling for payoffs.
Considering environment factor we ﬁnd that coefﬁcients
on normalized private (coefﬁcient 3.39, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, z = 3.14, p= 0.002) and social advantage (coefﬁcient 6.47,
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 3.92, p< 0.001) are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. The difference between the latter and
the former is also positive and signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, z = 2.54, p= 0.01). Switching to responsibility factor
we observe that coefﬁcients on normalized chance (coefﬁcient
3.61,Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 3.25, p= 0.001) and personal
advantage (coefﬁcient 6.52, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 3.70,
p< 0.001) are positive and signiﬁcantly different from 0. The
difference between coefﬁcients on personal less chance normal-
ized advantage is positive but not signiﬁcant as in the left ventral
striatum (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 1.38,p= 0.17). The non-
parametric analysis of normalized advantage, without controlling
for payoff, in principle conﬁrms the results obtained in panel
analysis when we controlled for payoffs.
To investigate the interaction between the two factors, envi-
ronment and responsibility, we consider the disaggregated model
design with all four treatments. We estimated neural CI (Eq. 3)
in right ventral striatum cluster to be 2.12 and signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 1.98, p= 0.05).
Further, for each participant we compute CI in the right striatal
cluster and based on affective ratings, and found that the neural
CI is positively correlated with behavioral CI (Pearson correla-
tion coefﬁcient is 0.22). The OLS regression of neural CI against
behavioral CI gives positive coefﬁcient 0.78 but not signiﬁcant
(p= 0.36). In the analogical robust regression the coefﬁcient is
0.75 (p= 0.17), also not being signiﬁcant. In contrast at the left
ventral striatum the analogical coefﬁcients were signiﬁcant in both
regressions.
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Table A1 | Lotteries used in the experiment.
Pair number Lottery X = (X 1, p, X 2) LotteryY = (Y 1, q,Y 2)
X 1 p=Prob(X 1) X 2 Y 1 q =Prob(Y 1) Y 2
1 −5 0.25 0 −1 0.50 −1
2 −4 0.67 1 −2 0.50 −2
3 4 0.33 −4 −3 0.25 0
4 4 0.33 −4 −2 0.33 0
5 12 0.25 −5 1 0.50 1
6 10 0.25 −4 1 0.50 1
7 9 0.33 −5 0 0.50 1
8 8 0.25 −3 0 0.75 2
9 18 0.50 −4 9 0.67 5
10 17 0.50 −3 8 0.67 6
11 10 0.25 −1 3 0.75 1
12 12 0.33 −2 4 0.83 2
13 16 0.25 −4 2 0.50 2
14 15 0.33 −5 2 0.50 2
15 24 0.33 3 12 0.67 6
16 25 0.33 2 10 0.75 8
17 22 0.14 3 7 0.67 7
18 24 0.17 4 8 0.75 8
19 13 0.25 2 6 0.75 2
20 12 0.33 1 7 0.67 1
There are two lotteries in each choice: X= (X1, p, X2) and Y= (Y1, q, Y2), where in the lottery X the prize X1 realizes with probability p and the prize X2 realizes with
probability (1−p), with similar notation applying to the lottery Y. The lottery pairs with odd numbers are distinct. The lottery pairs with even numbers are slightly
perturbed ones relative to the preceding odd-number pairs.We used these pairs of lotteries in all treatments, with exception of the treatment (private, chance), where
odd numbered pairs were used only. No pair was repeated within a treatment.
Table A2 | Areas in universal network for counterfactuals.
ROIs Average coordinates Size
x y z
Superior temporal gyrus 59 −7 −1 858
Inferior parietal lobule 55 −30 31 53
Culmen 44 −36 −26 211
Pyramis 41 −68 −32 142
Superior temporal gyrus 37 −1 −16 61
Medial frontal gyrus 21 30 26 152
Medial frontal gyrus 17 −44 15 56
Anterior cingulate −1 42 −2 1559
Subcallosal gyrus −4 23 −12 150
Middle frontal gyrus −30 27 45 433
Middle temporal gyrus −33 −57 16 140
Middle temporal gyrus −35 −49 9 56
Middle frontal gyrus −39 52 6 161
Inferior frontal gyrus −48 39 −2 70
The regions of interest in the universal network for counterfactuals identiﬁed in the contrast of advantage against the baseline at comparison event. The threshold is
p<0.02 FDR corrected.
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FIGUREA1 |Treatments at evaluation stage as displayed to subjects. First outcome event is presented and then followed with comparison event.
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